Dr Hassan Elbahtimy
The determination of regional actors in the Middle East to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating, and the possibility of even further regional proliferation has driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control.
Missiles have long played a key, if relatively understudied, role in Middle Eastern security dynamics. According to Dennis Gormley’s 2017 estimate, over 90% of all missiles used in conflict since the Second World War have been in the Middle East.
Today, the determination of regional actors to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating. Missiles play a growing role in national defence doctrines in the region and many states are driven to acquire them due to the increasing appreciation of their utility as conventional precision-strike systems, as well as symbols of military prowess. Their frequent use by local and external powers in recent and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the possibility of even further regional proliferation have driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments.
This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. These two themes form the paper’s two parts. The paper starts by exploring some of the key contemporary trends related to missiles in the Middle East. It examines the various regional powers interested in advanced missiles and the emergence of non-state actors as users and developers of missile technology. It also explores the regional appeal of cruise missiles and considers the growing use of advanced missiles as conventionally armed stand-off weapons. Finally, this section explores the regional interplay between offensive and defensive missiles. The second part of the paper charts some of the recent attempts to develop regional arms controls and considers some of the approaches to missile control, including some cross-cutting themes that any missile control efforts might wish to address.
While missile holdings in the Middle East have grown in terms of the types, ranges and platforms used, this paper focuses its examination on ballistic and cruise missiles of ranges exceeding 250 kilometres. The value and reach of this range can vary in different sub-regional settings but is used here as a rough metric indicating the ability to target across borders, as well as a reflection of a degree of technical capability. While the paper incorporates land-attack missiles, it excludes missiles that are closely tied with battlefield or tactical missions, such as those with shorter ranges as well as anti-ship and air-defence platforms. Similarly, armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) are excluded from the analysis. While their use has grown in prominence, particularly in some regional conflicts including in Syria, Libya and Yemen, they form a separate category of weapons with distinct dynamics, and thus pose different questions for arms control.
The Houthis present high, low and slow challenges to the UAE’s air defence
By Fabian Hoffmann
The Houthis’ latest missile attacks on the United Arab Emirates may herald further escalation as the group attempts to raise the costs of the Emirati involvement in Yemen’s conflict. The attacks also demonstrate how potent a threat the combination of UAVs and ballistic and cruise missiles can be.
The combined use of ballistic and cruise missiles and other types of air-breathing munitions has increasingly been seen as a means of challenging even multi-layered air-defence systems. Until recently, though, few analysts would have foreseen that a Yemeni rebel group would be in the vanguard of employing such tactics.
Yemen’s Ansarullah – often referred to as the Houthis – launched ballistic and cruise missiles along with direct-attack uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) at targets in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on 17 and 24 January 2022. Although the damage was limited, it provided Ansarullah with the propaganda message that it could carry out attacks against its opponent’s territory at ranges over 1,000 kilometres.
Return of the Quds
The 17 January attack, which targeted the Musaffah oil facility in Abu Dhabi, resulted in several casualties, including three killed. The Houthis claimed that several Quds-2 cruise missiles were used in the attack while Zulfiqar medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and Samad-3 direct-attack UAVs were launched at other targets, including Abu Dhabi International Airport. The subsequent 24 January attacks targeted Al Dhafra Air Base, likely using Zulfiqar ballistic missiles again. Other unspecified sites in the UAE were also targeted using direct-attack UAVs.
The Quds-2 appears to be an extended-range version of the Iranian-designed Quds-1/351 ground-launched land-attack cruise missile, previously assessed to have been supplied to the Houthis by Iran. The Quds-2 was first apparently used against an oil facility in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in November 2020. The Quds-2 may use a more fuel-efficient and powerful engine than its predecessor, which employed an unlicensed copy of the Czech TJ-100 turbojet engine. This alteration may have increased the system’s range from 700 km to roughly 1,000 km.
The Zulfiqar is an MRBM with an estimated range of 1,500 km. It is a modified version of the Iranian road-mobile, liquid-fuel Qiam-1 with a circular error probable of at least 1,000 metres. Liquid-fuel missiles like the Zulfiqar require lengthy launch preparations compared to a solid-fuel missile, rendering them more vulnerable to targeting. Following the 24 January attack, the still-assembled launcher was struck by an Emirati airstrike.
Why now?
When claiming responsibility for the missile attacks, the Houthi’s military spokesperson said the attacks were motivated by ‘US–Saudi–Emirati aggression.’ Despite operating the Zulfiqar since at least 2017, the Houthis have not launched ballistic-missile attacks on UAE territory until now.
The group’s last attack against the UAE took place in July 2018, when it targeted Abu Dhabi International Airport and Dubai International Airport using Samad-3 UAVs, causing minor damage. The recent missile attacks, therefore, raise the question of why the Houthis have targeted the UAE now, despite the withdrawal of Emirati armed forces from Yemen in mid-2019.
In a statement released through the Houthi-owned Almasirah media company, the group linked its missile attacks to what it claimed was the UAE’s ‘recently escalated […] aggression against Yemen.’ Despite withdrawing its personnel from Yemen, the UAE continues to be involved in the conflict by backing pro-government forces through financial and logistical support. Most significantly, in recent months the UAE-backed Giants ‘Al Amaliqah’ Brigades have retaken control of the energy-rich Shabwa governorate in south-eastern Yemen from Houthi forces, following the pro-government group’s transfer from the western part of the country.
In the absence of other potential Emirati targets, such as military bases and air-defence systems, which the Houthis attacked when UAE forces were deployed to Yemen from 2015–19, the group has now attempted to increase the political and economic costs for Abu Dhabi’s continued involvement in the conflict by launching missile attacks within its national borders. Adopting such a strategy is similar to the group’s use of missile and UAV attacks against Saudi Arabia to try to impose costs on Riyadh for its involvement in the conflict.
In isolation or indicative?
The UAE used Patriot and THAAD batteries to engage the missiles. The latter was used to successfully intercept an MRBM for the first time operationally during the 17 January attack. Some of the weapons used in the two attacks were not intercepted, which reflects the challenge of defending against a combination of UAVs and ballistic and cruise missiles. This has likely not gone unnoticed by the Houthis or Iran.
The Houthis have threatened further possible attacks on the UAE, but the extent to which a sustained campaign could be mounted remains uncertain. While the Houthi rebels have a diverse range of missile systems, many of which bear Iranian hallmarks, the number of longer-range ballistic missiles in their inventory is unknown. Longer-range attacks against Saudi Arabia by the Houthis have been sporadic, which may be evidence that the Houthis have only a limited number of longer-range systems.
While the Houthis have some local capacity to assemble shorter-range missiles using equipment supplied by Iran, larger and more complex MRBMs would require disassembly prior to their transfer from Iran to Yemen and reassembly in Houthi-controlled areas. This would make deploying large numbers of missiles more challenging. By comparison, the modular build of the Quds cruise missile, combined with its far-smaller size, makes it an easier weapon to supply covertly.
The apparent limited availability of longer-range missiles may mean that attacks utilising such systems are less likely. But as the conflict continues, so too will these sporadic extended-range strikes. Furthermore, the tactic of challenging defences by using ballistic and cruise missiles in combination with direct-attack UAVs is likely to be adopted more frequently, and defenders will seek effective means to counter such threats.
Fabian is a part-time Research Assistant in the Defence and Military Analysis Programme, providing research and administrative assistance on the IISS’ emerging technologies portfolio.
Credits | IISS