By Oumarou Sanou
The post–Cold War international order was never perfect, but it rested on an implicit bargain: economic integration, shared security frameworks, and a rules-based multilateral system that, however asymmetrical, offered predictability. Today, that fragile system is cracking. What we are witnessing is not merely a shift in global power centres; it is a contest for the very architecture that governs the relations between the powerful and the weak.
In Davos earlier this year, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered a speech that resonated far beyond Canadian audiences. He warned that the world is experiencing “a rupture, not a transition” in the international order—a rupture driven by great power rivalry, coercive economic instruments, and the abandonment of long-standing norms that underpinned international cooperation. Carney’s admonition was clear: “If we are not at the table, we are on the menu.”
Carney’s words are particularly relevant in light of the behaviour of the United States under President Donald Trump. Whether it was threats of acquisition or control over Greenland, aggressive tariff wars, or overt economic coercion against traditional allies like Canada, Trump’s actions revealed a willingness to privilege raw national interests over collective stability and legal norms.
Trump’s repeated threats to Greenland—suggesting the United States might pursue control of the territory and even floating military options—were not only alarming in themselves but illustrative of a broader willingness to subordinate sovereignty to strategic ambition. When such rhetoric comes from a self-described champion of “America First,” it sends a sobering message: might still make right in the world, even among countries that claim to champion democracy and the rule of law.
Meanwhile, revelations that officials from Washington held private meetings with Alberta separatist activists in Canada stirred fears of foreign interference in a neighbour’s internal affairs. Critics in Ottawa denounced these contacts as a breach of Canadian sovereignty. Such actions, whether driven by geopolitical opportunism or domestic political theatre, further illustrate the weakening of mutual respect that once characterised Western alliances.
Yet it is not only Western allies who have felt the tremors of this shifting order. Trump’s use of tariffs as negotiation tools—far beyond strategic trade leverage, extending toward punitive measures against Canada, Mexico, and other trading partners—underscored a willingness to weaponise economic integration itself. The result: fractured alliances, defensive economic posturing in Europe and Asia, and a deterioration of trust that had anchored global cooperation for decades.
For Africa, these developments are not abstract. They serve as both a warning and a lesson.
First, the era of assuming predictable behaviour from great powers—whether the United States, Europe, or others—is over. If a democracy like the US can threaten tariffs or territorial ambitions without significant institutional pushback, what then for African states facing far more powerful neighbours or external influences? Africa must understand that in a multipolar scramble, goodwill will not protect it. Sovereignty must be backed by strategy and diversified partnerships.
Secondly, the Trump era illustrates the limits of aligning too closely with any one power. African nations have long faced pressure to choose between Western influence and alternative models—whether from Russia, China, or other actors. What Africa needs, as Carney suggested for middle powers, is “cooperation without subordination”: strategic alignment that preserves autonomy rather than replacing one patron with another.
This is where many pseudo-pan-African narratives fall short. They paint Africa’s choices as binary—either anti-Western or pro-Russian/Chinese. Such framing is simplistic and dangerous. Africa’s challenge is not to replace one hegemon with another, but to craft an independent strategy rooted in its own developmental priorities, not the geopolitical interests of outsiders.
Africa also faces internal vulnerabilities that external actors can exploit. Just as the alleged Trump Administration’s interactions with Canadian separatists raised fears of meddling in domestic cohesion, many African states grapple with separatist movements, ethnic tensions, and governance deficits. These internal fractures could be manipulated by external powers seeking influence–be it the US, Russia, China, EU and the others. Nigeria’s own experience with separatist agitation, for example, could invite unwelcome foreign interest if not managed within a strong governance framework.
The Trump era also underscores the importance of resilience in global institutions. Carney’s critique of the “rules-based order” highlighted how powerful states can weaken norms and leverage economic integration as coercion rather than cooperation. For Africa, which relies on international norms for trade, security, and diplomacy, this erosion is dangerous. It means engaging not only in bilateral relationships but also strengthening regional architecture—from the African Union to ECOWAS and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)—to buffer external shocks and present collective leverage.
Moreover, Africa must invest in economic self-reliance and intra-continental cooperation. Reliance on distant powers for security, investment, or economic growth leaves African states vulnerable to external shocks and policy whims. Strengthening intra-African trade, harmonising regulations, and building joint capacities in critical sectors can provide a foundation from which African states negotiate rather than capitulate.
Finally, the African diplomatic corps must be modernised. Africa needs representation that not only attends global summits but actively shapes narratives and defends African interests. Just as Western powers deploy elaborate strategic communication and lobbying capabilities, African states must professionalise their diplomatic engagements to protect sovereignty and influence outcomes.
The emerging world order is marked by competition, not cooperation. This reality will not change simply by wishing it so. Africa’s response must be pragmatic, strategic, and rooted in its own interests—not in reaction to external pressures but in pursuit of its own vision of prosperity, stability, and sovereign self-determination.
Oumarou Sanou is a social critic, Pan-African observer and researcher focusing on governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, regional stability, and African leadership dynamics. Contact: sanououmarou386@gmail.com