Sat. Apr 13th, 2024
By Sven Biscop, Bart Dessein & Jasper Roctus

Up until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s and China’s worsening relations with the European Union and the United States meant that the world order was at risk of falling apart into two rival blocs, as during the Cold War: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese. Since 24 February 2022, that is not so clear anymore. The more Russia escalates the violence in Ukraine, but also the strategic anxiety (by putting its nuclear forces on alert), the more difficult it becomes for other powers to stay completely aloof, let alone to simply align with Russia. The more EU and US sanctions reverberate throughout the global economy, the more it becomes impossible for other powers to avoid going at least partially along. China in particular has in fact already made a defining choice.

Kingdom in the middle


China’s instinct when other powers go to war is to avoid taking any explicit stance.2 When Russia is involved, China will not always openly support it, but it will hardly ever openly go against it (and vice versa).3

Judging from a quotation from the China National Defense Newspaper in the People’s Daily on 11 February 2022, China at first, indeed, distinctly leant towards
Russia, blaming the US and NATO for the tensions, and ridiculing the American warning that large-scale invasion was imminent.4 Many even suspected
collusion, assuming that Vladimir Putin must have informed Xi Jinping of his plans while in Beijing for the Winter Olympics.

Putin likely did warn Xi of impending action, but,judging from reports in Chinese official media, Chinaappears to have been taken by surprise by the scale of the actual invasion. Initial media reports spoke of
“trouble in Eastern Ukraine” and largely ignored the assault on Kyiv. 5
This is also evidenced by how China
bumbled the evacuation of its citizens from Ukraine, leading to derision on Chinese social media. Initially Chinese citizens were urged to proudly display the
Chinese flag when they went out, so as to prevent Russian fire. After a few days, however, Beijing implicitly admitted that this might provoke violence, due to increasing anti-Chinese sentiment in Ukraine, and by the third day of the invasion, it advised citizens to remain indoors and hide their identities instead,6
before finally recommending evacuation via Moldova.7

As the war unfolded, China’s public stance began to evolve. On 25 February already, China (along with India and the United Arab Emirates) abstained from the vote in the UN Security Council on the draft
resolution condemning Russia; only Russia itself voted against. The Chinese ambassador explained the abstention by the need for caution, adding that “Ukraine should be a bridge between the East and the West, not an outpost for major powers”.8 The Liberation Daily, the newspaper of the Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party of Shanghai, reported that on the same day, in a telephone conversation between Xi and Putin, the former again expressed
understanding for Russia’s “reasonable security concerns”, and stated that “China supports the Russian side to solve their problems with the Ukrainian side through negotiations”, while also referring to respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.9 On 1 March, foreign minister Wang Yi spoke with his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba,
stating that “China deplores the outbreak of a conflict between Ukraine and Russia, calls on Ukraine and Russia to find a solution to the problem through
negotiations, supports all constructive international efforts conducive to a political solution, and is extremely concerned about the harm suffered by
civilians”.10


As to the sanctions, the Chinese foreign ministry stated that “China is not in favour of using sanctions to solve problems”. 11 Beijing is unlikely to follow the EU and
the US in freezing Russian reserves or to halt trade with the country. But it cannot totally avoid the impact of the sanctions either. The Bank of China’s Singapore
branch, for example, is but one of several banks that has stopped financing trade in Russian commodities, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has
frozen all its activities in Russia and Belarus.


A multipolar world


This does not mean that China is now “on the side” of the EU and the US. But, set against the backdrop of Western fears that China might abuse the moment to revert to force of arms itself to change the status quo concerning Taiwan, Beijing’s actual position is very restrained. Those fears did not take into account, in any case, that the last time China went to war was against
Vietnam in 1979. Going to war now would completely overturn the world’s perception of China, therefore, and the potential impact on all of its international relations would be immense. While by no means
impossible, it would certainly be an enormous gamble.12


Silent pragmatism puts China on the side of its own interests. What that does mean, is that we are in a truly multipolar world. Each of the current four global players pursues its own interests; these interests overlap more often with those of some than of others, but they do not overlap completely. In the end, therefore, each
of the four cooperates, or not, with each of the other four, as its interests dictate. China and Russia regard each other as close partners against perceived American hegemony. At the same time, China’s often
very assertive yet mainly politico-economic strategy requires a degree of stability. Now especially the CCP needs to project stability, as it is preparing for the expected re-election of Xi Jinping as General-Secretary later this year. Russia, in contrast, is pursuing an aggressive politico-military strategy that allows it to
make the most of its resources in conditions of instability.


Beijing welcomes Russian military interventions that preserve stability, like recently in Kazakhstan. But a war (and, after some initial reluctance, as of early March Chinese media seem willing to call it just that) 13 that destroys a country seen as a major hub for the Belt and Road Initiative, and that provokes a global economic shockwave, is hardly in China’s interest. This reality explains the following opinion in the Liberation Daily of 2 March: “Ukraine’s renewed application to become
member of the EU at this time is not unexpected. The EU is an economic integration organization, not a military one, and Ukraine will legitimately receive more economic support after joining the EU, without stepping on Russia’s ‘red line’”. 14

Putin regularly clamoured for multipolarity, but what he really meant was an end to perceived American unipolarity. What he did not want, but has now provoked, is an international arena ruled by actual
multipolarity, in which he has to compete for the support of other states. Only to find out that he can coerce only a very few into aligning, and that he has little to attract the others, while his brutal aggression has
shaken the equipoise even of those inclined to favour his version of events.


In a multipolar world, the EU strategy of dealing with other powers as partner, competitor, and rival all at once, is the right one. Great powers traditionally compartmentalise their relations: they cooperate where they can, but push back when they must. Even towards Russia, after the initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the EU kept signalling that it was willing to cooperate in areas where interests coincided. Russia declined. By launching a war of aggression, it has now finally made
compartmentalisation impossible, and forced the EU to reduce all relations to a minimum.


Chinese support for (eventual) EU membership of Ukraine, while resolutely backing Russian opposition to NATO membership,15 shows that China is still looking to compartmentalize its relations with the West. This is no surprise. After all, by also applying compartmentalisation to China, in spite of all the recent frictions, the EU, and even to a large degree the US,
have enabled it to assume the position that it has today. Had they not done so, and treated China exclusively as a rival, Beijing may have seen no other option than to
fully align with Russia. Instead, China currently has too much at stake to opt for such a choice. Now is not the time, therefore, to overplay the “democrats vs
autocrats” narrative: The West needs some of the world’s other autocrats to help dam in their Russian colleague.


Conclusion: One world


Will China eventually play a more active role in solving this crisis? That it could provide Russia an economic lifeline may actually be in the interest of the EU and US.
Western sanctions are intended to hurt, to signal to Russia and to the world at large that violating the core rules of the international order comes at a price. But
they are not meant to make Russia collapse, which might provoke escalatory behaviour – remember Japan’s reaction to the US oil embargo that crippled its
economy in 1941: the attack on Pearl Harbor. Continued trade with China could prevent such an apocalyptic outcome.


At the same time, Beijing could make use of that relationship to signal its discomfort to Moscow behind the scenes and prove itself to be a “responsible stake holder”. A public mediation initiative would carry the
prospect of great diplomatic prestige, but comes without any guarantee for success, and thus runs counter to China’s risk-avert instincts on the international stage. A private message from Xi to Putin that expresses his hopes that this war ends soon, however, might be just as effective.


The fact is that by its stance to this date, China has already made a defining choice. Had China fully supported Russia in its war of aggression it may well have tipped the world into a new bipolar rivalry. Instead, there is still a chance to keep the world
together, to maintain one set of rules that all states subscribe to, because to pursue its interests, China needs the stability that these rules create. Russia has put
itself outside that order for now, but the aim must be to bring it too back into the fold eventually. Only a world order that includes all great powers of the day can
be truly stable. China’s self-interest may just overlap enough with our self-interest to make it happen.

Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop lectures at Ghent University and heads the Europe in the World programme at the Egmont Institute. He is the author of Grand Strategy in 10 Words – A Guide to Great Power Politics in the 21st Century.

Prof. Dr. Bart Dessein lectures on modern and contemporary China at Ghent University, where he is head of the research group ’‘East Asian Culture in Perspective: Identity, Historical Consciousness, Modernity”. He also is a Senior Associate Fellow at Egmont.

Jasper Roctus is a PhD researcher in the “East Asian Culture in Perspective: Identity, Historical Consciousness, Modernity” research group at Ghent University (funded by the Research Foundation – Flanders), working on modern narratives surrounding Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). He also is a former research intern at Egmont.

Credit | Egmont

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